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The growing power of the European Union in the political and economic landscape illustrates the 
trend of regionalism that is expanding throughout the world. Regionalism has become a "buzz" 
word in the international relations field, and many developing countries are attracted by the 
promises of political influence and economic stimulation that regional organization has been able 
to provide the countries of Western Europe. An ever increasing list of regional organizations is 
being fonned in the developing world, including Mercosur (Southern Common Market) in Latin 
American and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Sub-Saharan Africa is 
another region that has fully embraced this trend of regionalism. Both continent-wide regional 
organizations like the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and the new African Union are 
enjoying increasing memberships, while memberships in smaller sub-regional organizations like 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) are also rising. 
Traditionally these regional institutions have been primarily focusedon unity and 
economic development, but recently a new trend has begun to emerge among regional 
institutions. Beginning with NATO's 1995 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervention in 
Bosnia, regional organizations have shown an increasing desire to become involved in 
peacekeeping. African regional organizations have eagerly welcomed the advent of regionalized 
peacekeeping forces as a way to mitigate the destabilizing effects of conflict. Given the rise of 
these regional peacekeeping efforts in Africa, this thesis asks: Are these regional peacekeeping 
missions an effective way of building stable governments and establishing lasting peace? 
Background 
Before I advance to the core analysis of my thesis, I will provide the reader with the background 
necessary to understand my later investigation into African regional organizations and their 
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peacekeeping initiatives. First, I will begin by outlining several key concepts that will recur 
throughout this paper. 
Definitions 
As the premise of this paper is the growing trend of regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, it 
is important to define regionalism. Regionalism refers to the growing trend of countries 
organizing around shared economic and political experiences, as well as, around common 
security interests. Members of regional organizations choose to centralize decision-making in a 
common institution governed by the members themselves. By pooling together their 
sovereignty, regional organizations hope to "empower themselves vis-a-vis the external 
international environment."} Regional organizations can have a variety of goals. For some 
regional organizations like the European Union, the focus is mainly economic cooperation. 
Other organizations (e.g., NATO) exist solely for security purposes. The regional institutions 
examined in this paper have expanded upon their traditional political and economic activities to 
include peacekeeping in their overall mandates. 
The peacekeeping process is another tenn which needs to be accurately defined within 
the scope of this analysis. This paper outlines a very generalized definition of what comprises a 
peacekeeping mission. Any operation seeking to engage in conflict prevention or conflict 
mediation is designated a peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping missions may occur in the case 
of any inter- or intra- state conflict in which an organization deploys a contingent of troops 
whose goal it is to establish or preserve a peace agreement. 
History of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 
1 Laakso, Liisa. "Beyond the Notion of Security Community: What Role for the African Regional Organizations in 
Peace and Security?" The Round Table. Vol. 94, No. 381. September 2005. p.491. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa is a region best known for its history of instability and violence. This 
widespread and permeating conflict is one of the reasons that my research question is so 
pertinent. After achieving independence from their colonial governments in the 1960s, most 
African countries experienced decades of rule by strong patrimonial leaders often called the "Big 
Men" of Africa. 2 These rulers led governments characterized by wasteful spending, failing 
economic policies, and ethnic tension. Rather than implementing principles of democratic rule, 
the "Big Men" of Africa maintained control by playing ethnic groups off of one another and 
exploiting long-standing hostilities. Their governments were focused on, "seeking personal gain, 
often precipitating violence for their own ends."J 
As poverty on the continent increased so did civil unrest as the "Big Men" began to lose 
their grip on power. Economic frustration and ethnic strain reached a peak in the 1980s, as the 
level of violence in Africa increased rapidly. Conflicts became both inter- and intra- state in 
nature. Countries including Angola and the Nigeria descended into chaotic and deadly civil 
wars. The widespread proliferation of arms and the Cold War proxy status of many of these 
conflicts guaranteed the civil clashes would be especially violent. These wars also created a 
variety of spillover effects, including the forced migration of refugees and involvement of 
external forces, both threatening the stability of entire regions. Tribal strife surfaced across the 
continent gripping countries like the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Cote 
d'Ivoire. 
These civil conflicts are not a just a distant memory in sub-Saharan Africa. Their 
devastating effects still play an important role in region's current instability. Many of the 
aforementioned conflicts occurred primarily in the late 1980's and into the 1990s. For instance 
2 Meredith, Martin. The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. Public Affairs: New York, 
2005. ***Term taken from book. .. do I need a specific page number to cite? 
3 Meredith 688. 
Encalade 5 
civil conflicts like those in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone all occurred within the last 20 
years. Current conflicts are still causing widespread violence as in the case of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The civil war in DRC has proved to be one of the most deadly 
conflicts on the continent, killing more than 5 million people in less than 10 years. The country 
has only recently achieved a tenuous peace agreement, and violence still jeopardizes the 
democratic process. Recent elections in Kenya also demonstrate the frailty of many African 
governments. Contested elections in January 2008 find the country teetering on the brink of a 
civil conflict. Hundreds have already been killed in outbreaks of violence between the rival 
Kikuyu and Luo tribes, and further hostilities are eminent if the leaders are not able to negotiate a 
settlement. 
Civil unrest is not the only type of military problem facing Africa. Inter-state conflicts 
have also become a source of instability. Border wars like those in Ethiopian and Eritrea have 
claimed many lives and destabilized relations between nations. The Ethiopian and Eritrean war 
continued throughout the 1980s and did not conclude until 1991 when Eritrea achieved 
independence. The war took a great toll on the populations of both countries, resulting in more 
than 100,000 deaths and over one-third ofEritrean citizens being displaced.4 Inter-state conflicts 
have also resulted in violence in other countries including Senegal and Mauritania. Many 
domestic conflicts in Africa have also overrun national boundaries and caused violence in 
neighboring countries. The ethnic fueled conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi demonstrate this 
principle as they caused violent skirmishes in both the DRC and Uganda. 
The many examples of violence described in the previous paragraphs illustrate the cycle 
of conflict encompassing many African countries in the last several decades. Violent conflicts 
are all too frequent in Africa. Jones and Duffey find that, "historical divisions and animosities 
4 Meredith 678. 
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continue to exacerbate nascent and incipient conflicts" in many countries, while "ethnic 
fragmentation and nationalism have resurfaced as major sources of instability in some of the 
newly independent countries.,,5 According to Table 1, Africa is second in the world in anned 
conflicts with 102 conflicts from 1990-2003. 
TlJble 2: Armed Conflicts b, Rf'gion 
Europe .\liddle [he 
East .\'~ia .\meriCil!i ~\friclI 
1990 . 4 13 4 11 
1991 I 6 11 4 11 
1992 3 5 12 3 1 
1993 5 6 10 3 1 
1994 4 6 10 3 6 
1995 3 6 11 3 5 
1996 I 6 10 3 3 
1997 
-
4 9 2 4 
1998 I 4 9 2 11 
1999 2 3 9 2 11 
3100 1 4 9 2 9 
~Ol 1 4 9 3 1 
~02 1 2 9 3 6 
~O3 1 3 8 3 4 
Figure 1: Moller, Bjorn. "Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity." Danish Institute/or International Studies. Working 
Paper. 2005. p. 6. 
This data is sobering especially since it excludes many conflicts (e.g., the war in Sudan) that 
have erupted in the last five years. The huge number of African conflicts is troubling also in 
light ofthe great humanitarian toll of war. In the year 2000, "more than ten major conflicts were 
underway in Africa" with "one-fifth of all Africans [living] in countries batter by war," and more 
than "12 million were classified as refuges.,,6 Africa's status as a conflict-prone region threatens 
stability and becomes a barrier for political and economic development. 
The international community, primarily acting through the United Nations, has not 
ignored conflicts in Africa. The role of the international community is best illustrated by its 
5 Jones, Richard and Tamara Duffey. "Sharing the Burden of Peacekeeping: The UN & Regional Organizations." 
Peacekeeping & International Relations. Vol. 25. Issue 3. May/June 1996. p.4. 
6 Meredith 679. 
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reaction in two recent conflicts: Somalia and Rwanda. The Somali people, separated by the 
arbitrary lines of colonialism, began a decades-long struggle to reunite their nation after their 
independence from Italy in 1960. In 1961 the Republic of Somalia was formed bringing together 
a majority of the Somali people; however, large minorities of Somalis were living in the Ogden 
area of Ethiopia. The nationalistic desires of Somali leaders to form a nation-state became a 
source of great tension between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as, a proxy conflict between the 
United States and Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, American support of Somalia 
decreased and domestic pressures sparked violence throughout the country. Conflicts culminated 
in a 1991 coup that destabilized the entire country. Somalia transformed into a nation with, "no 
recognized government, only a collection of rapacious militias vying for control, ready to loot 
and kill at will.,,7 
The United Nations under new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali became 
increasingly concerned over the Somali conflict and believing an intervention was justified. He 
felt, "national sovereignty should be overridden by the United States Security Council in cases 
where it was deemed necessary for peace enforcement."g Following pressures from other aid 
organizations, the UN established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (Unosom) in April of 
1992. Unosom's initial purpose was to send 50 unarmed peacekeepers to monitor a tenuous 
cease fire and 500 UN troops to protect them.9 This mission suffered from a lack of resources, 
poor logistical support, and bureaucratic fighting. All of which contributed to the mission's 
collapse. 
As the cease fire expired in 1992 and the country descended back into violence, it became 
extremely dangerous and nearly impossible for humanitarian organizations to provide relief or 
7 Meredith 471. 
8 Meredith 471. 
9 Meredith 472. 
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food aid. In response to widespread criticism from these humanitarian organizations, the UN 
later established another UN force, Unitaf, to provide a secure environment for the aid agencies 
to work in Somalia. This mission too proved to be a failure, as the estimated number of those 
that died from starvation before the Unitafintervention is between 100,000 and 125,000.10 
Despite the failure of Un os om and Unitaf, the Security Council approved the fonnation 
of another UN mission in the spring of 1993 known as Unosom II. The new mission's mandate 
was to disann the militias and establish "a new government, a new police force, and a new 
justice system" and to rebuild the country's economy.!! Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah 
Aideed viewed this new mandate of disannament as a declaration of war against the Somali 
people, and engaged the UN troops in guerilla-style battles in the streets of Mogadishu. The 
operation in Somalia descended into complete chaos as US raids attempted to capture Aideed. 
This horribly failed mission in which 18 soldiers died and "the battered corpses of two dead 
soldiers were dragged as trophies through the streets by angry mobs" eroded all support for the 
Unosom II mission.!2 
As the US and other nations removed their UN troops from Somalia, the Unosom II 
mission was vacated. The final pullout from Somalia occurred in March of 1995. The $4 
billion mission was deemed a complete catastrophe, and Somalia was left to internal chaos 
resulting in violent clashes between warring militias. Even as the UN withdrew in defeat, looters 
descended upon the $160 million UN compound, "stripping everything of value." 13 The 
disastrous Somalia intervention had lasting effects on the UN's ability to act as a peacekeeper. 
Led by the US setting "[stricter] conditions on any US involvement in [future] UN peacekeeping 
10 Meredith 477. 
11 Meredith 478. 
12 Meredith 483. 
13 Meredith 484. 
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operations," the UN organization as a whole became much more hesitant about advocating 
further interventions. 14 The general attitude towards UN involvement in Somalia experience is 
best expressed as "a Unicef official described Somalia as 'the greatest failure of the UN in our 
lifetime. ",15 
The Somali conflict is not the international community's only experience with 
peacekeeping missions in Africa. UN peacekeeping forces also intervened in the 1994 Rwandan 
crisis. Once a picturesque tourist destination with a stable economy and government in the 
1970s and 1980s, Rwanda symbolized African potential. The beginning of the 1990s saw the 
country regress into instability. Using historic tensions between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi 
minority group, "a fanatical elite engaged in a modem struggle for power and wealth using [this] 
ethnic antagonism as their principal weapon.,,16 Through the careful manipUlation of the media 
and exploitation of the Hutu fear of Tutsi dominance, elites incited a genocide of historic 
proportions, and by July of 1994 more than 800,000 people had been slaughtered and nearly 2 
million more were refugees. 17 
In the decades since its independence from France, Rwanda appeared stable from the 
outside while ethnic tension simmered below the surface. Many Tutsi minorities had been 
forced into exile in neighboring countries where they organized the Rwanda Patriotic Front 
(RPF). RPF's mission was to resettle Tutsi exiles and support reform of the one-party Rwandan 
political system. In 1990, RPF launched an incursion into Rwandan territory. Sensing the 
growing tensions and possibility of wide destabilization the international community pressured 
Habyarimana to sign a cease fire in 1992. The withholding of aid by Western donors eventually 
14 Meredith 484. 
15 Meredith 474. 
16 Meredith 487. 
17 Meredith 523. 
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forced Habyarimana to sign the Arusha Accords peace agreement with the RPF in 1993. This 
tenuous peace agreement was virtually ignored as the Hutu government continued to stockpile 
machetes and other weapons, while militia groups began to recruit and train members. IS 
During this time the international community acted to protect the fragile peace. The 
Arusha Accords established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (Unamir); 
however, the UN remained haunted by its failures and was apprehensive about its level of 
involvement. This trepidation delayed the deployment of the mission for several months as 
officials wrangled over the exact size of the contingent. Military experts recommended a 
minimum of 8,000 peacekeepers while the U.S. only proposed deploying 500. Led by Canadian 
general Romeo Dallaire, the Unamir mission finally consisted of 1,300 troops. The force was 
primarily composed of Bangladeshi soldiers who were poorly prepared and ill-equipped.19 
This lack of support and preparation would become a theme for the Unamir mission. 
Dallaire found himself "short of vehicles, fuel, ammunition, radios, barbed wire, medical 
support, and even petty cash. ,,20 Rather than enforcing the peace agreement, Unamir spent more 
time fighting with the UN for supplies and support. The ineffectiveness of the mission was 
almost assured as the UN denied Dallaire the intelligence support needed to monitor the Hutu 
militias and their plans. The ghosts ofthe UN's military failure in Somalia caused the UN to 
also refuse the Unamir mission the mandate to conduct arms seizures. Even presented with 
knowledge of Interahamwe, the Hutu militia, planning and stockpiling weapons in preparation 
for an ethnic cleansing, the UN denied Unamir's request to confiscate arms shipments. This 
mandate refusal was perhaps the most debilitating limitation, leaving Dallaire powerless to stop 
the impending genocide. 
18 Meredith 501. 
19 Meredith 502. 
20 Meredith 502. 
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The UN's fear that another highly public failure like Somalia "would produce a UN 
meltdown" reduced Unamir to a bystander status watching the genocide unfold.21 Violence 
engulfed the entire country following the April 6 assassination of President Habyarimana. 
Almost immediately planned murders were executed by the Hutu militia targeting prominent 
Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Hutu leaders began to call on the larger population to assist them in 
eradicating the Tutsi enemy. Ten UN peacekeepers were also killed in the violence. 
The Unamir mission remained on the ground and General Dallaire refused to comply 
with UN pressure urging him to abort the mission and evacuate. He and his troops were left 
isolated with no support. The Belgian contingent of peacekeepers under orders by their 
government to withdraw left Unamir in dire conditions. Nevertheless, Dallaire still felt that the 
genocide could be curbed with more troops and adequate support. Ignoring Dallaire's advice 
and feeling Unamir was doomed, the UN passed a resolution removing the majority of its 
peacekeepers. However, unexpectedly days later the UN, under pressure from secretary-general 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, authorized a second peacekeeping force, Unamir 2. Conflict over the 
deployment location of the 5,500 additional troops prevented this mission from taking effect. 
The genocide came to a close in July as the RPF forces secured control of Kigali. The 
conflict left Rwanda as the poorest country in world and more than one-third of its Tutsi 
population murdered.22 The conflict also spilled over into other countries including the DRC and 
Burundi, further destabilizing the entire region. The UN missions Unamir and Unamir 2 were 
deemed complete failures as they proved incapable of stopping the genocide. Rather than being 
motivated by the lessons of Somalia, the UN was paralyzed by its fear of becoming too deeply 
involved in a humanitarian conflict. Coupled with its catastrophe in Somalia, the UN's 
21 Meredith 505. 
22 Meredith 523. 
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reputation as a world peacekeeper was severely tarnished. African countries were left feeling 
abandoned by the international community. 
The Way Peacekeeping Works 
The disastrous effects of conflict like those seen in Somalia and Rwanda have generated a 
strong international interest in preventing widespread ethnic conflict and genocide. This interest 
has raised the importance of developing mechanisms for effective conflict resolution. 
Peacekeeping has emerged as one of the primary mechanisms of conflict prevention and 
resolution. The violent nature of many inter- and intra-state conflicts have necessitated outside 
intervention for a variety of reasons, most notably humanitarian needs. There are two basic 
approaches to peacekeeping-international and regional. Both methods have their pros and 
cons, and this paper's primary focus will be on the potential of the latter form. Nonetheless, it is 
important to understand the benefits and challenges of the more established international 
approach before an analysis of the regional method can take place. 
International Peacekeeping. International peacekeeping efforts take place under the auspices of 
the UN. Peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the UN framework as the preferred method 
of conflict resolution. Rather it was "invented by the United Nations as a new and innovative 
way of addressing conflicts, in light of the ineffectiveness of the collective security provisions 
under the charter.'.23 With the end of the Cold War, the UN felt the need to change its 
approaches to conflict. It expanded upon the strictly military operations of its past and 
modernized to meet the needs oftoday's more multidimensional conflicts. This transformation 
has included growing involvement in humanitarian crises and intra-state conflicts. 
23 Kieh, George Klay. "International Organizations and Peacekeeping in Africa." Peacekeeping in Africa. Ed. Karl 
P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998. p.15. 
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Although they are not outlined in the original United Nations Charter, peacekeeping 
missions still derive their mandates from the UN Charter. Chapter VI of the charter outlines a 
procedure for conflict arbitration between two states, while Chapter VII authorizes military 
involvement on behalf of the UN.24 Peacekeeping has become a new mechanism by the which 
the UN deals with the problems I described in previous chapters. In fact, former secretary-
general, Dag Hammarskjold referred to peacekeeping, "as belonging to 'Chapter Six and a Half 
of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as 
negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under 
Chapter VII. ,,25 
With respect to its peacekeeping missions in Africa, the UN has used both Chapter VI 
and Chapter VII to authorize its involvement. Chapter VI has been the primary mandate for 
African peacekeeping missions?6 The Rwandan conflict is an example ofthis authorization as 
Unamir was deployed only after the signing of the Arusha Accords. Unosom and Unosom II, the 
UN missions in Somalia, fell under the mandate of Chapter VII as the missions sought to 
militarily "establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.'.27 Using these 
two mechanisms the UN has authorized 20 African peacekeeping missions, making it an integral 
part of the efforts to build a sustainable peace on the continent. 28 
Launching a multilateral response from an established international organization like the 
UN provides several advantages in the conflict resolution process. The neutrality of the United 
Nations is unparalleled and is a tremendous asset in peace negotiation. A Security Council 
24 United Nations Charter. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> 
25 United Nations Peacekeeping. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/> 
26 Boulden, Jane. "UN Security Council Policy on Africa." Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations 
and Regional Organizations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. P.14 
27 Boulden 14. 
28 Boulden 12. 
Enca1ade 14 
resolution authorizing peacekeeping activities lends an inordinate amount of legitimacy to an 
operation. The UN's impartiality also ensures that "the viewpoints of third party states and 
subnational actors will be represented" in the peacekeeping operation.29 By mobilizing minority 
factions and investing them in the peace process, agreements are more likely to be upheld.3o 
In addition to neutrality, another asset of UN led peacekeeping is its financial and 
resource support. In contrast to regional or single-nation organizations, the United Nations has a 
much larger portion of its budget devoted to peacekeeping. It also has a large constituency to 
which it can appeal for additional funding. The relative wealth of the UN allows it to provide its 
troops with access to state-of-the-art technological resources, both in safety equipment and 
logistical support. Access to these financial and technological resources allows the preparedness 
of UN forces to be far superior to that of other multilateral and regional peacekeeping forces. 
While the resources and impartiality of UN troops are unrivaled, there also several 
disadvantages to mobilizing UN peacekeeping operations. First there is the large bureaucratic 
structure of the United Nations. The veto power of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council makes it difficult for the UN to authorize the deployment of a peacekeeping force. For 
instance, since the Somalia crisis the United States has been wary of funding or providing 
resources for large-scale missions. This has made the U.S. much more likely to exercise its veto 
power. The growing tension over human rights between the U.S. and China has also acted as an 
obstruction to the peacekeeping process. Often criticized for its own human rights abuses, China 
has shown great reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations. Together these 
obstacles help account for the devastating delays and inaction of the UN peacekeeping missions 
as seen in Rwanda and Somalia. 
29 Diehl, Paul F. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and 
Multinational Options." Armed Forces and Society. Vol. 19. No 2, 1993. p.22 
30 Diehl "Institutional Alternatives" p. 22. 
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The bureaucratic infighting is not confined to the authorization of missions. In Somalia 
and Rwanda the disagreements among the UN member states continued to affect the missions 
after they were approved. The lack of adequate support has rendered many missions virtually 
ineffective. For example, the fighting over resource allocation hampered General Dallaire's 
ability to halt the genocide in Rwanda. He was unable to secure enough soldiers, supplies, or 
logistical support to mount an effective effort. Another inefficiency resulting from the 
bureaucratic structure of the UN is its incapacity to designate missions with the appropriate 
mandates. Afraid of causing conflict among its member states, the UN often refuses to give its 
peacekeeping forces any real power. The operation in Rwanda was denied permission to seize 
arms, a decision which proved disastrous as these weapons promulgated the genocide. 
Regional Peacekeeping. The UN's inability to deploy peacekeeping missions until conflicts 
have spiraled out of control, along with the delays caused by bureaucratic infighting have led 
many nations to take peacekeeping into their own hands. The rise of regional peacekeeping 
developed as a second approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the wake of the UN's 
difficulties. The UN Charter indicates a preference for regional action in the incidence of a 
conflict. It states in Chapter VI Article 33, the "parties to any dispute threatening international 
peace or security 'shall, first of all, seek a solution ... [and] ... resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means oftheir own choice. ",31 This sentiment is echoed again 
in Chapter VIII which states, "such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement 
of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before 
referring them to the Security Council.,,32 To reinforce its support for regional peacekeeping 
institutions and "to remove any doubt of the preference for a lower-tier approach, the Charter 
31 O'Brien, David. "The Search for Subsidiarity: The UN, African Regional Organizations and Humanitarian 
Action." International Peacekeeping. Vol. 7, No.3. Autumn 2000. p.60. 
32 United Nations Charter. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> 
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stipulates that the Security Council should [also] actively promote regional solutions to regional 
problems.,,33 In fact, many scholars have argued that this preference for "disputants to exhaust 
regional possibilities before invoking UN measures, in effect [makes] regional agencies the 
'gatekeepers' for the Security Council.,,34 
Although encouragement of regional means of conflict prevention and resolution is well 
entrenched in the UN Charter, regionalism was not a popular approach until the 1990s. O'Brien 
finds that this renewed interest in the potential of regional organizations has developed because 
of the "UN's midlife crisis brought on in part by the stress resulting from African conflicts.,,35 
He believes that with "repeated humanitarian crises there are mounting political and financial 
reasons why donors are calling for greater participation of regional organizations.,,36 The UN 
was under tremendous pressure during the 1990s as it faced "state collapse and armed conflict in 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, and the Great Lakes.,,3? The "escalating expense of 
deploying Blue Helmets to more places for larger costlier missions" caused the UN and its donor 
states to look towards regional cooperation as a potential solution to its overstretched 
infrastructure. ,,38 
Regional organizations quickly answered the call of the UN and have dramatically 
increased their peacekeeping operations. Evidence of this growing involvement by regional 
organizations is demonstrated in Table 2. 
33 O'Brien 60. 
34 Mamika, Maurice. "Regional Peacekeeping: The Case for Complementary Efforts." Peacekeeping and 
International Relations. Vol. 25, No.3. May / June 1996, p. 9. 
35 O'Brien 60. 
36 O'Brien 60. 
37 O'Brien 61. 
38 O'Brien 61. 
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TAILB 2.1 PBAcucmIPING INrn.ATm BYTHI UN AND lbGIORAL 0aGANlzm0NS, 1""1-
sooS 
P.d.oIi ~ U .... NI&lo:a. 
{".-1'''' 1 l 
1 SlSS-I971 , S 
1972-1988 5 6 
]989-2.00s 51 44 
Figure 2: Diehl, Paul F. and Young-1m D. Cho. "Passing the Buck in Conflict Management: The Role of Regional 
Organizations in the Post-Cold War Era." Brown Journal o/World Affairs. Vol. 12, No.2. Winter / Spring 2006. 
p.195. 
The period 1989-2005 illustrates the extraordinary increase in the responsibility of regional 
organizations. Troubled Africa's reputation as a conflict-prone region, African regional 
organizations have responded with the greatest enthusiasm to the UN's emphasis on regional 
peacekeeping. Prior to 1994, only eight peacekeeping operations had been undertaken by 
African organizations. By 2005 the number had increased to 25.39 The dominance of African 
regional organizations in the peacekeeping field is seen in Table 3. 
Abbmriadons used: as (Commonwealth ofIndcpc.ndent States), EClEU (Europetn Comm.unirylE~ 
pean Union), ECOWAS (Economic Community ofWt.$l Afrlc:an St:ateS), LAS (League of Arab StateS), 
NATO (North. Atlantic: Treaty 01pllizarion). OAS (Orpl1ir.ation of American States). OAUJAU (Orp-
nization of African UnionJAfrkan Union). OSCE (Organization for Sccwiry and Cooperation in Eu· 
rope), SADe (Soudttrn African DeveIopmctn Community). Otbc:t$ Include CEMAC (Economic: and 
Monetary Union of Central African Swcs), CEN-SAD (the Community of Sahel and Saharan Scnes), 
and OECS (Org:a.nisadon ofEuc Caribbean Swcs). 
Figure 3: Diehl and Cho. "Passing the Buck." P. 196. 
The four sub-Saharan African organizations listed, OAU / AU, ECOW AS, SADC, and CEMAC, 
together account for over half of all regional peacekeeping operations undertaken since the 
Second World War. 
39 Diehl and Cho. "Passing the Buck." p. 196. 
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With the growing inclination of regional organizations to resort to their own 
peacekeeping operations, a more detailed analysis ofthe advantages and disadvantages ofthese 
regional operations is necessary. One of the key advantages of regional peacekeeping is that it 
encourages local solutions to local problems. In the words of a report released by the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "the lesson of Rwanda for African 
leaders was that they 'should no longer wait for action by the international community or the 
Security Council. ",40 This type of attitude shift is seen across Africa as leaders guided by South 
African President Thabo Mbeki have encouraged an African Renaissance. The movement 
"seeks to inspire African leaders to create the conditions for peace, security, and development.,,41 
Focusing on their own abilities to resolve conflict, not only decreases the overall financial 
burden ofthe UN, but it also encourages African countries to take responsibility for their own 
security. The increased accountability creates an environment where African nations work 
eagerly to ensure stability and prevent conflict. Aware of the high fmancial and humanitarian 
costs of peacekeeping missions, countries are more likely to engage in an early intervention if 
they are the ones forced to pay the expenses of a full-scale peacekeeping operation. 
Another benefit of the regional approach to peacekeeping is the increased knowledge that 
regional states have about local conflicts. A regional organization is better able to understand the 
origins and tensions of a specific conflict than a larger organization like the United Nations. 
Marnika argues that this indicates regional organizations are "better able to provide early 
warning, infonnation gathering and fact finding," elements essential to successful operations.42 
Additionally, the regional peacekeeping forces' understanding of the conflict grants them more 
legitimacy with the local populations. The greater support bestowed on regional forces as 
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opposed to a multinational force like the UN is "based on the notion that people and 
governments in a region have a natural affinity with those in that region and an inherent 
suspicion of what is perceived as outside intervention.'.43 Legitimacy allows regional forces to 
operate more efficiently and effectively, cooperating with the local population. 
A principal benefit of regional peacekeeping is the ease at which consensus can be met. 
One of the UN's greatest peacekeeping failures is its ability to rally member states to authorize a 
peacekeeping deployment. Regional organizations have an advantage "over global 
[ organizations] because their membership is more homogenous. ,,44 "States in a regional 
organization are more likely to be at the same development level, have similar historical roots, 
share some ethnic or tribal roots, and have similar outlooks flowing from facing common 
regional problems"-all of which make consensus probable. Also increasing the likelihood of 
consensus is the possibility of spillover effects. Conflict in the region could destabilize other 
countries by causing spillover effects or an influx ofrefugees.45 These potential and undesirable 
effects encourage regional organizations to respond quickly to disturbances. 
While the regional approach to peacekeeping has strengths, it also has several 
weaknesses. A key disadvantage for regional operations is the general resource deficiency these 
organizations encounter. It has proved incredibly difficult for regional associations to supply 
their peacekeeping troops with the same level of technology and logistical support as the UN is 
able to provide its peacekeepers. The financial burden on a regional organization would be 
immense. For example, "a regional peacekeeping operation would incur expenses similar to 
those of a UN operation, but would have fewer states to draw upon for contributions.'.46 This 
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44 Diehl. "International Alternatives ... " pA. 
45 Marnika 9. 
46 Diehl. "International Alternatives ... " p. 6. 
Encalade 20 
resource problem has been exacerbated in regions like Africa, where most states are poor and not 
very technologically advanced.47 
The composition of regional peacekeeping troops is another area of concem~ Whereas 
the increased knowledge about local conflicts is a positive aspect of having troops from 
neighboring countries, local troops can be quite problematic. Diehl finds that "a key requirement 
for peacekeeping success is that the troops be composed of personnel from disinterested states 
and that they be perceived as impartial by the combatants.,,48 Regional peacekeeping troops 
violate this criteria as their force ''would likely be composed of regular soldiers from national 
armies [who] ... are more likely to go beyond the limitation imposed by the peacekeeping strategy 
and become embroiled in the conflict.,,49 The troops composed of these national army soldiers 
are also often lacking in the "accumulated experience to mount and sustain" a successful 
peacekeeping mission. 50 The varying levels of training and technology across individual 
contingents of troops results in a lack of standardization which can dramatically complicate a 
mission's objectives. 
In addition to the problems associated with troops, regional peacekeeping operations also 
face challenges in resisting dominance by a regional hegemon. The lack of resource and 
financial support needed to deploy a peacekeeping mission often leads regional organizations to 
depend heavily on their wealthiest members. This reliance becomes problematic as the "larger, 
wealthier states become politically dominant because of their overwhelming role.,,51 In this case, 
a hegemon would be able to dictate the operations of the mission with little regard as to the 
concerns of other members. The opposite can also prove true. A regional hegemon could 
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effectively block the authorization of peacekeeping mission it does not support or intentionally 
sabotage a mission if one is approved. 52 
Why My Research Question Is Important 
In recent years, Africa has confronted many conflicts by undertaking regional 
peacekeeping missions. This begs the question: Is this an effective approach? To address this 
question I will analyze two case studies of African regional peacekeeping-Chad and Liberia. 
Authorized by two different African regional organizations during two different decades, these 
case studies offer an opportunity to examine the varying methods of regional organizations and 
the evolution of regional peacekeeping in Africa. The Chadian Civil War in the early 1980s is an 
important case as it marked the first regional peacekeeping endeavor undertaken by an African 
organization. My other case, the Liberian Civil War of the late 1990s is an interesting situation 
as it was the most widespread intervention by an African regional organization to date. An 
analysis of these two cases hopes to provide enough information to effectively evaluate whether 
regional peacekeeping missions are valuable in establishing sustainable peace agreements. 
Case Studies 
In this section, I will examine two case studies of regional peacekeeping in Africa: Chad and 
Liberia. The civil wars raging in each of these countries and the interventions led by the OAU 
and ECOW AS provide ample material to examine the outcomes of regional peacekeeping 
initiatives. It is also important to determine how the regional approach to peacekeeping 
functions in an sub-Saharan African environment. 
Chad 
Chad's history is that of a nation caught between two worlds. Bordered by Arab-
controlled, Muslim North Africa to the north and black Africa to the south, the domestic 
52 Diehl. "International Alternatives ... " p. 9. 
Encalade 22 
problems of Chad mirror this unique geography. The country is divided between the many Arab, 
semi-nomadic tribes of the northern Sahelian region and the black, sedentary Sara Christians of 
the South. The relationship between these groups has been "replete with animosity and conflict" 
for several centuries.53 Much of this historic tension resulted from the region's reliance on the 
slave trade as its economic engine. Northern tribes captured and exported southerners as slaves 
to neighboring countries, including Sudan, Egypt, and Libya. Clashes between the two groups 
periodically engulfed the country in violence. 
The deep-seated hostilities that began with the slave trade were only exacerbated by 
colonialism, ''when peoples of different cultures and with histories of enmity were lumped 
together on paper without even a pretense of integration made by the colonial overlord.,,54 
Immune to the precarious cultural situation of the Chadian territory, French colonists inflamed 
ethnic tensions by favoring the black tribes of the South. Impressed by the willingness of the 
Sara people to adopt the French language and culture, the colonists rewarded them with 
"economic resources, administrative skills, and military power.,,55 The "Muslim north 
vehemently rejected Christian penetration and secular western education" as they resisted all 
aspects French rule. 56 
Perhaps the most significant legacy of colonial rule was the abolition of the historic slave 
trade. By outlawing the trading of black slaves, the French killed the economic livelihood ofthe 
northern tribes. This led the "southern Sara ethnic group [to view] the French as 'saviors,'" 
while northerners "viewed the French as 'infidels' imposing a foreign rule over them.,,57 As a 
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result of slavery's end economic power became concentrated in the hands of the southerners and 
created a "dramatic reversal of the historical relationship" between the two groupS.58 By the time 
Chad achieved independence under President Francois Tombalbaye in 1960, "the Sara of the 
south dominated the government, the economy, and the army.,,59 The power shift left the 
country ripe for conflict as tensions simmered just below the surface. As Mays explains, "the 
French preference for southerners over the more hostile northerners, compounded with a lack of 
development and a long history of conflict, helped set the stage for post-independent strife in 
Chad.,,60 
Conflict history. Following independence Chad was ruled by the Sara people. Bitter memories 
"about depopulation and ravaging of whole areas and destruction of entire tribes by Muslim 
slave raiders were still alive" and caused the black administrators to "savor their new power and 
[rule] with brutal vengeance.,,61 President Tomb alb aye consolidated his power "by relying 
primarily on naked force and the strategic use ofviolence.,,62 Muslim groups in the North were 
forbidden to organize an opposition party and barred from government participation as 
Tombalbaye instituted a one-party state.63 Northern tribes refused to succumb to the new power 
balance favoring the southerners. In an effort to "rearrange the power structure in their favor 
[and] regain their autonomy" they formed FROLINAT (Front Liberation Nationale du Tchad).64 
FROLINAT, founded in 1966, was a united insurrection force that joined together three separate 
anti-government movements.65 
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The subsequent FROLINAT rebellions destabilized the Tombalbaye regime as they 
spread from the regional level to a nationwide revolt. Under a constant barrage of attacks, 
Tomb alb aye sought French help to stablize his government. The French launched the MRA 
(Mission de la Reforme Administrative) which served as "a military holding operation designed 
to contain the civil war while Tombalbaye introduced a series of reforms and reconciliation 
measures prescribed by French advisors.,,66 Despite French intervention, FROLINAT forces 
maintained a strong presence, and the southern government remained under constant pressure. 
Refusing to institute any reform measures, Tombalbaye was eventually killed in a 1975 coup led 
by his own army officers. Support for the united FROLINAT force also began to waiver as the 
group splintered, and factions led by Hissene Habre and Goukouni Weddeye battled the support 
of the Muslim North.67 
GAU response. "Although the conflict in Chad had been raging since 1965, it was not until 
1977, at its Libreville (Gabon) Summit" that the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) began to 
discuss intervening in the Chadian crisis.68 Founded in 1963 by a group of African leaders, the 
"primary goal of OAU was to create "a continental organization that would foster African 
unity.,,69 The OAU sought to cultivate a pan-African identity and reject the vestiges of 
colonialism. While the founders expressed concern about the potential for arbitrary colonial 
boundaries and the tribal nature of African society to cause conflict, the deVelopment of a 
peacekeeping infrastructure remained an afterthought.7o The Charter of the OAU does not 
specifically authorize military intervention, but "Article 20 makes a provision for a Defence 
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Commission and Article 2, paragraph (f) urges members to co-operate in the fields of defence 
and security.'m Building upon these informal arrangements, the OAU had previously delegated 
its conflict resolution duties to a variety of ad hoc commissions established for specific 
disputes. 72 
The OAU's initial attempt to halt the violence in Chad was through the establishment of 
the Chadian ad hoc committee in 1977. The first task of the committee was to investigate the 
charges that the Libyan government was providing funds and support for the FROLINAT 
forces. 73 Meanwhile, the Chadian government continued to deny allegations that the conflict 
was a civil war, maintaining "the fayade that its conflict was with Libya, and that the OAU's 
intervention was constitutionally permissible only in that situation of inter-state conflict. ,,74 
Despite Chad's refusal to recognize the domestic nature of the conflict, the OAU's willingness to 
mediate "was unique, because it was, at the time, the only internal conflict in Africa in which 
substantial intervention by a regional organization was permitted by the state in crisis.,,75 After 
several months the ad hoc committee was able to broker a peace deal between Chad and Libya, 
as well as secure "the first cease fire agreement between the Chadian government and the 
FROLINAT" forces. 76 
Signed in March of 1978, the ceasefire never took effect because of the growing domestic 
crisis in Chad.77 Fighting between the northern and southern groups continued and in February 
of 1979, northern forces defeated Tombalbaye's successor, Malloum. The overthrow of 
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Malloum's government meant an "end to southern domination over the Muslim north.,,78 
Although FROLINAT forces had secured control of the Chadian government, fighting still 
continued as the conflict transformed into "a struggle for power among the Muslim leaders 
themselves as Hissene Habre was challenged by his longstanding northern rival, Goukouni 
Weddeye.,,79 1979 produced another significant change in the Chadian crisis. According to 
Mays, it was during this year that "Nigeria emerged as a principal backer and regional leader 
behind a negotiated settlement in the crisis.,,8o It was through Nigeria's efforts that peacekeeping 
first emerged as viable strategy in "the long-term conflict management process.,,81 Nigeria 
believed the deployment of a peacekeeping force was essential "to support peace negotiations.,,82 
The Kano conference in March of 1979, led by Nigeria, "was the first attempt to bring 
together all important factions and interested parties, within and without Chad for the purpose of 
seeking a negotiated settlement ofthe confiict.,,83 Despite a few initial setbacks, the meeting was 
greeted as a success. Its chief accomplishment was the signing of The Kano Accord on National 
Reconciliation. This document established a transitional government, known as the Transitional 
National Union Government (GUNT) which "would govern Chad until national elections could 
be held. 84 Each of the factions involved in the conference received two ministerial positions in 
the government, although Habre and Weddeye were barred from participation in the new 
government85 In addition to the founding of the GUNT, the Kano Accords also saw the 
signatories agree to a "cease-fire and the fielding of a peacekeeping force manned by Nigerian 
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soldiers.,,86 The first peacekeepers arrived by the end of March and worked as "a 'buffer-force' 
between the government's forces and those ofRabre.,,87 
Even with the additional peacekeeping forces, the conflict in Chad persisted. Several 
difficulties surfaced after the signing of the Kano agreement, including the exclusion of several 
important factions. 88 Not invited to the Kano talks, a series of northern leaders banned together 
and "threatened to form a counter group to challenge GUNT. ,,89 "Dismayed by the deterioration 
of the situation in Chad, Nigeria hosted a second Kano peace conference on April 3, 1979" in 
hopes of correcting the problems of the first conference.9o The Kano II talks immediately 
erupted in controversy as "Nigerian authorities reportedly placed [Rabre and Weddeye] under 
house arrest until they agreed to cooperate with the other factions.'.9l The GUNT fell apart as the 
Weddeye and Rabre formed a new government placing themselves at the center of authority and 
excluding the peripheral factions. 92 The situation descended into further disarray as "relations 
between the principal Chadian factions and Nigeria became increasingly contentious.,,93 In an 
effort to force the factions to comply with its mediation attempts, Nigeria "resorted to an oil 
boycott, cutting off oil supplies to landlocked Chad.,,94 This only served to further enrage 
Weddeye and Rabre who responded by "[denouncing] the high-handed behavior of Nigeria" and 
"[demanding] the withdrawal of Nigeria's peacekeeping force that the Chadians now viewed as 
an 'occupation army.",95 
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Following the disastrous failure ofthe Kano II talks, Nigeria once again attempted a 
mediation conference in May of 1979. Despite the attendance of the five factions originally 
excluded from the Kano I conference, the talks ended in disappointment the following day. The 
four controlling factions of the new GUNT, including Habre and Weddeye refused to take part in 
the reconciliation attempt.96 Finally in August, Nigeria enlisted the help of the OAU in 
organizing the Lagos II conference. This meeting included "the participation of all eleven 
Chadian factions.,,97 The most significant outcome of the Lagos II conference was the Lagos 
Accord, an agreement which allowed the OAU to assemble a peacekeeping force to ensure 
cooperation and stability in Chad. The Lagos Accord laid out the following conditions 
concerning the DAU force: 
1. The independent monitoring commission will oversee an effective neutral 
force. 
2. The neutral force will: 
a. oversee the 'specialized services,' including the Air Force and 
maintenance personnel, of the Chadian armed forces until the 
formation of a new GUNT. 
h. protect all important Chadian personalities. 
c. protect the civilian population of N'Djamena, Abeche, Faya, 
Moundou, and Sahr. 
d. ensure the free movement of the civilian population throughout 
Chadian territory. 
3. The neutral force should consist of soldiers from one or more countries not 
sharing a common border with Chad. [After signing the Lagos Accord, the 
signatories agreed to accept the offers of Benin, Congo, and Guinea to 
contribute contingents to the force.] 
4. The mandate of the neutral force terminates when a national integrated army 
is established in Chad.98 
As laid out above, the OAU peacekeeping force had an ambitious role to play in Chad. After the 
failure of Nigeria's mediation attempts, this OAU force seemed to be Chad's only hope for a 
peaceful end to the conflict. 
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Much of the optimism espoused in the Lagos Accord had already begun to erode as none 
of its key provisions had been implemented by the end of 1979.99 Funding problems also 
plagued the DAU as the peacekeeping force was set to begin its mission. Without any additional 
DAU funding, the countries which "were to provide the neutral African force appeared unable to 
bear the cost of such an undertaking.,,100 Although Benin and Guinea had promised to contribute 
to the peacekeeping force, only the "Congolese contingent consisting of 550 soldiers, arrived in 
N'Djamena on January 18, 1980.,,101 The under preparation of the force for such a large task 
was immediately evident in its transportation problems. The force reportedly "arrived in 
N'Djamena aboard Algerian aircraft piloted by Angolans.,,102 Facing hostile fire and a lack of 
logistical support, the Congolese peacekeepers were "sequestered in barracks till they were 
evacuated by the French" less than 3 months after the beginning of their mission.103 
The Chadian conflict became more complicated following the withdrawal of the initial 
OAU peacekeeping force. The fighting between Weddeye and Rabre continued as a large scale 
intervention of Libyan troops in support ofWeddeye's regime invaded Chad. By the end of 
1980, "6,500 Libyan troops were stationed in Chad, with 2,500 stationed in N'Djamena.,,104 
Following widespread outcries by the other factions in Chad, several African nations, and even 
France, the OAU initiated a long, tenuous negotiation process to remove the Libyan troops. 
After several setbacks the Libyan troops departed and the second OAU peacekeeping mission 
was deployed in November of 1981.105 
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The second OAU peacekeeping force had better organization and was composed of 
soldiers from Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, Congo, and Togo; however confusion over the 
peacekeeping force's mandate immediately complicated the mission. 106 While the OAU 
intended to remain a neutral force, Weddeye "still envisioned the OAU force performing a peace 
enforcement mission within Chad and protecting GUNT from [Habre's] offensive.,,107 The force 
also encountered significant financial problems, as OAU member states were still unable to 
finance the mission predicted to cost around $162 million.108 The individual countries 
contributing troops were relegated to depend on the assistance of France and the United States to 
fund their operations. The OAU sought UN financial support for the mission, but the Security 
Council refused to "commit itself to any extensive financial or operational contribution to a 
peacekeeping operation that would not be under its own political authority and military 
direction." 1 09 
Without a widely supported mandate and financial security, the peacekeeping mission 
succumbed to failure. The ceasefire established with the deployment of the second peacekeeping 
force ended and fighting between Weddeye's and Habre's forces continued. Weddeye began to 
attack Habre's contingents "withdrawing behind OAU lines [following the attacks], knowing that 
Habre's men were avoiding contact with the neutral soldiers."llo Despite this underhanded 
strategy, Habre's forces had secured control of much of Chad and launched a successful attack 
on the capital, capturing it on June 7, 1982.111 Having already ordered the withdrawal of 
peacekeepers before the attack on N'Djamena, the OAU only sped up the process, and all 
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peacekeepers were removed by the end of June. 112 In less than "a seven-month period between 
November 1981 and June 1982 [the OAU] witnessed the fielding, maintenance, and withdrawal" 
f · k· ... Ch d 113 o Its peace eepmg mISSIon m a. 
Assessment of the OAU response. The complete failure of the OAU's two peacekeeping 
deployments makes it difficult to outline many positive outcomes. Withstanding the barrage of 
criticism directed towards its actions in Chad, the OAU did receive some praise for its 
willingness to attempt mediation. The OAU's deployment of peacekeeping troops represents an 
honest endeavor at finding an African solution to an African problem. The organization sought 
to preserve the stability of the region and end a humanitarian crisis by launching its own 
response to the growing conflict in Chad. The OAU was also able to lend some legitimacy to the 
peacekeeping process as it was able to bring all factions to the negotiation table during the Lagos 
II conference. 
Following the embarrassing withdrawal of its first two peacekeeping deployments, it is 
important to examine the shortcomings of the OAU's mission in Chad. The first series of 
problems resulted from the complexities ofthe conflict in Chad and the OAU's overly 
complicated mandates. Amoo finds that the "mandates for the peacekeeping initiatives, 
Nigeria's and the OAU's, were too broad, overly ambitious, and unrealistic.,,114 For instance, the 
troops were supposed to enforce a cease-fire between the warring Chadian factions; however, no 
ceasefire had ever been successfully implemented. The vagueness of the mandate meant that 
there was not a widespread understanding as to the "status and specific functions ofthe 
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peacekeeping force.,,115 This left troops vulnerable and unprepared in the midst of a conflict 
zone. 
Additionally the mission failed as it was unable to establish the necessary respect 
amongst the warring factions. The "perennial refusal of the various warring factions to 
cooperate with the peacekeeping force" caused the continual failure of negotiations. 1 16 The 
factions feared that any "cooperation with the peacekeeping force would diminish their 
individual opportunity to seize control of state power.,,117 Collaborating with the peacekeepers 
was also unpopular as many groups viewed them as another warring faction. For example, 
Weddeye head of the GUNT believed the mission's purpose was "to repel any threat to the 
security of his government" and while under siege from Rabre's forces he "demanded the 
military assistance of the neutral force.,,1l8 At the same time the peacekeeping force was 
supporting the Weddeye regime, the "Zairean contingent [was providing] logistical and other 
support to other factions.,,1l9 By taking sides in the conflict, often contradicting their own 
efforts, the OAU peacekeeping mission was doomed to fail. Their biases prevented them 
establishing the respect needed to conduct a successful mission. 
Nigeria's dominance throughout the mediation process is another problematic outcome of 
the OAU's intervention into Chad. Beginning with the earliest peace conferences in Kano and 
Lagos, the roles of Nigeria and the OAU became entangled. It is unclear as to the level of 
involvement and support the OAU provided during the negotiation process. The OAU's 
willingness to allow Nigeria to control the peace process had disastrous effects. Rather than 
viewing the peacekeepers with as agents working on behalf of an internationally recognized 
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organization, the warring Chadian factions viewed the peacekeepers as agents of Nigerian 
foreign policy. This contributed to their reluctance to cooperate with the peacekeeping force. 
Perhaps the greatest negative aspect of the OAU's intervention was its inability to 
adequately fund and support a peacekeeping force. The mission was vastly understaffed. With 
only 3,000 soldiers, it was impossible for the force to "police more than ten militia, each with 
thousands of armed combatants.,,120 The OAU was also unable to provide enough funding for 
the mission. With an estimated cost of$162.8 million, the OAU was only able to collect 
$500,000 for the force. 121 This placed the primary cost burden on the countries contributing 
soldiers. Member-states struggled to provide funding for their troops as the domestic economies 
were often very poor. For instance, Benin which committed to sending peacekeeping troops was 
ultimately unable to send soldiers "because its troops had no military uniforms and 
equipment.,,122 The lack of funding and dependence on member-states also created many 
logistical problems for the peacekeeping contingent. For example, "the battalion from Zaire 
which was to take care of the medical needs of all the troops went with doctors, but without any 
drugs and medical equipment.,,123 The Benin contingent mentioned above was responsible for 
communications, and their inability to mobilize damaged the effectiveness of the entire mission. 
Together the funding problems, inability ofthe force to establish themselves as an independent 
party, coupled with Nigeria's dominant role and the overly ambitious mandates of the OAU 
caused the Chadian intervention to end as an embarrassing failure. 
Liberia 
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While Liberia has been splintered by conflict for much of the last 20 years, this case 
study will isolate the Liberian experience to only the conflict which occurred from 1989-1997. 
Beginning as a society for freed American slaves in the 19th century, Liberia has fiercely 
maintained its independence. Nurtured politically and economically by the United States, 
Liberia developed as it capitalized on its natural resource wealth. Its large rubber plantations 
owned by the Firestone Corporation created a strong export economy; however, politically and 
socially Liberia was a sharply divided society. Following Liberia's independence the 
relationship between the Americo-Liberian settlers and the native black ethnic groups remained 
tense. 
Conflict history. Liberia was ruled by the U. S. -supported Americo-Liberians until 1980 when 
Samuel Doe, a military officer, led a successful coup. Doe's subsequent rule had disastrous 
consequences for Liberian society. He forcibly suppressed all opposition creating a severely 
authoritarian, military government. As African studies scholar Herbert Howe writes, Doe "drove 
the country into deeper ethnic hostility and economic ruin [paving] the way for Liberia's civil 
war.,,124 Doe exacerbated existing ethnic tensions, placing his own ethnic group and supporters 
in powerful government positions. For instance, he politicized the army making it a presidential 
protection force, ethnically dominated by his own Khran people. 
Although his repressive nature was well documented, Doe maintained close ties with the 
United States. Liberia was an important Cold War ally for the U.S., as it helped to resist the 
spread of Soviet influence in Africa. The U.S. also had other strategic interests in the country 
including a navigation station and the largest Voice of America transmitting station on the 
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continent. l25 Doe's regime was rewarded for its allegiance to the U.S. as it was one of the largest 
recipients of aid money. Between 1980 and 1985 alone, Liberia received about $500 million in 
U.S. aid. 126 This influx of U.S. aid allowed Doe to remain in control; however, as the Cold War 
ended, his grasp on power began to slip. Liberia suffered the fate of many countries similarly 
used as Cold War pawns. No longer needed as an anti-Soviet ally, the U.S. dismantled its 
Liberian aid payments and programs. The loss of external investments dramatically increased 
domestic pressure on the Doe government which was unable to ensure political or economic 
stability. 
Rebel groups sensed this vulnerability and seized the opportunity to begin organizing 
against Doe. The major rebel group that developed during this period was the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. Building his force primarily from the Mano and 
Gio ethnic groups, "Taylor was able to capitalize on ethnic tensions mobilizing large numbers 
who hated Doe.,,127 Taylor received support from the neighboring Francophone West African 
nations of Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, both of which strongly disliked the Doe regime. 
Trained in Libya, by 1990 NPFL troops numbered around 10,000, although more than 30 percent 
were under the age of 17.128 They proved to be a threatening force to the Liberian government. 
By August of 1990 the NPFL had successfully destabilized the country, and Doe regime 
had lost all effective control of Liberia. Fierce fighting between the NPFL and Doe's Armed 
Forces of Liberia (AFL) had broken out around Monrovia and in the countryside. Each group 
targeted specific ethnic populations, driving the country into a tumultuous civil war. Splinter 
groups also developed and became involved in the conflict. The INPFL (Independent National 
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Front of Liberia) broke off from Taylor's forces and began fighting against both the NPFL and 
the AFL. Within months the economic infrastructure of Liberia was destroyed and large 
numbers of internally displaced peoples were at risk of starvation. Because of its close ties to 
Liberia and its stationing of 2,000 Marines off the Liberian coast, many expected the United 
States to take action; however, it was becoming increasingly improbable "that the United States 
would physically intervene and even less [likely] that the United Nations WOUld.,,129 
The refusal of the international community to react to the growing Liberian crisis pushed 
the West African regional organization into action. The members of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) feared the war "would increase refugee flows and political 
instability in their already impoverished states and further persuade foreign investors not to 
invest in West Africa.,,130 Other concerns centered on the well-being of foreign citizens living 
and working in Liberia, as well as, apprehension that the "constantly shifting military alliances 
could prove too much for these unstable and largely authoritarian regimes."l3l Consideration of 
these factors led ECOW AS to authorize its first peacekeeping intervention into Liberia. 
ECOWAS response. ECOWAS was initially established in 1975 as "a vehicle for economic 
collaboration.,,132 Its original charter included several non-aggression pacts but did not express 
any motivation to become involved in peacekeeping or conflict resolution. In the wake of the 
Liberian conflict, ECOW AS established the Standing Mediation Committee whose purpose was 
to design an appropriate peacekeeping infrastructure. In its first decision the Standing Mediation 
Committee called for the following objectives to be met in Liberia: 
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1. The parties to observe an immediate ceasefire; 
2. An ECOW AS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) to be set up for the 
purpose of keeping the peace, and restoring law and order and ensuring respect 
for the ceasefire; 
3. A broad-based interim government in Liberia set up through a National 
Conference of political parties and other interest groups; 
4. Free and fair elections within 12 months leading to the establishment of a 
democratically elected government; 
5. The exclusion of all leaders of the various warring factions to the Liberian 
conflict from the Interim Government; and 
6. The creation of a Special Emergency Fund for the ECOMOG operation in 
Liberia133 
A key aspect of this decision was the establishment ofECOMOG (Economic Community of 
West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group) on August 7, 1990 created to function as the 
peacekeeping branch of ECOW AS. ECOMOG was initially composed of contingents from 
several member-states' militaries and was "deployed in a non-threatening manner" hoping to 
persuade "Taylor and his men that this was not a force of occupation, or a force assembled in 
support ofDoe.,,134 The peacekeeping contingent was given an ambitious mandate of 
neutralizing the "warring factions through forcible disarmament if necessary" and "to conduct 
mediation and conciliation with the leaders ofthe warring factions.,,135 Its ultimate goal was to 
restore "law and order and to create the necessary conditions for a free and fair elections to be 
held in Liberia.,,136 
Less than a month after its creation, ECOMOG had launched its first intervention. 
Expecting "the NPFL would lay down its arms once ECOMOG made clear both its 
determination and its armed capability," ECOMOG's Force Commander Ghanaian General 
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Arnold Quainoo was stunned to encounter hostile fire during the force's landing. 137 While the 
NPFL continued its assault on ECOMOG forces, the two other factions offered support. 
,Cooperating for purely self-serving reasons, the INPFL and the AFL were "too weak to 
challenge ECOMOG directly, but each could benefit from ECOMOG's protection and from any 
destruction ECOMOG inflicted upon Taylor.,,138 Close ties with two of the warring factions 
complicated ECOMOG's mission and damaged its reputation. As Draman and Carment explain 
this cooperation, "unnecessarily escalated the conflict by pitting the 'peacekeepers' against one 
of the parties to the conflict in a way that created a disturbing disequilibrium.,,139 This 
relationship between ECOMOG and the INPFL and the AFL was further complicated when 
INPFL forces murdered 70 of Doe's bodyguards at ECOMOG headquarters and then murdered 
Doe nearby.140 The AFL understood this assassination as an act of aggression undertaken with 
ECOMOG support, and they retaliated by torching entire sections of Monrovia. 141 Less than six 
months into its intervention, there was a "widespread perception within and outside West Africa 
that ECOMOG had indeed become a warring faction in the Liberian conflict.,,142 
Following its initial difficulties, ECOMOG's commander General Quainoo resigned and 
was replaced with Nigerian Joshua Dogonyaro. His impact was immediate as he switched 
ECOMOG's mission from one of peacekeeping to one of peace enforcing. Coupled with a 
reinforcement of troops and supplies, ECOMOG was able to gain control of Monrovia and force 
Taylor to sign the Bamako cease-fire agreement in November of 1990.143 ECOMOG and NPLF 
began meeting in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire in 1991 to participate in peace talks designed to 
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create a permanent cease-fire and settlement. While temporarily successful in halting the 
fighting in Liberia, the cease-fire did not prevent the warring factions from allowing the conflict 
to spillover into neighboring Sierra Leone. Taylor began to fund the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF), a group of Sierra Leonean rebels, in an effort to pressure the government to withdraw 
support from ECOMOG. 144 Anti-Taylor refugees and former AFL members responded by 
forming ULIMO (United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy). The fighting 
between the two groups spilled back into Liberia, destroying the progress that had been made 
during the 1991 Yamoussoukro peace talks. 
After less than two years of peace, the cease-fire was violated by the NPFL as it launched 
"Operation Octopus." The operation was a "two-month siege of ECOMOG-held Monrovia.,,145 
Taylor's actions forced ECOMOG back into its strategy of peace enforcement, and intense 
fighting took place for several months. Reacting aggressively, ECOMOG was able to intensify 
pressure on Taylor. His troops retreated across Liberia losing much of their territory and 
economic base. 146 The dire condition of his NPFL army compelled Taylor to participate in the 
1993 peace talks in Cotonou, Benin. Adebajo gives ECOMOG much ofthe credit for the 
formation of the new cease-fire, as they "had in effect bombed Charles Taylor to the negotiating 
table.,,147 
The Cotonou agreement was unique in that it included the dispatching of UN observers to 
ensure the peace agreement was upheld. In early 1994, 368 UN observers comprising UNOMIL 
(United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia) arrived in Monrovia. 148 This mission was the first 
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time that a UN force had been deployed simultaneously with a regional peacekeeping force. 149 
Although a significant development for peacekeeping cooperation the UN force was extremely 
limited in its activities rendering it virtually ineffective. 
Despite its initial promise, fighting between splinter groups also eroded the Cotonou 
cease-fire. Conflict reignited in 1994 and continued through 1995, despite a series of failed 
negotiations. The first Abuja Accords signed in 1995, "like all those before it, collapsed under 
the weight of inter-group rivalries and widespread killing.,,15o As ECOWAS leaders began to 
realize the popularity and power of Charles Taylor, they found "the need to align themselves in 
order to achieve peace and stability in Liberia.,,151 A series of meetings between Nigerian leader 
Sani Abacha and Taylor in 1995 "paved the way for a peace settlement.,,152 In August of 1996 
leaders of the warring factions agreed to a revised version of the Abuja Accords. A series of 
benchmarks set by the agreement included the "implementation of disannament and 
demobilization by 31 January 1997; dissolution of all factional militia by the end of February 
1997; general elections by 31 May 1997; and formation ofa national government by 15 June 
1997.,,153 This new agreement created stability, and the conflict came to a close as Charles 
Taylor was democratically elected to the Liberian presidency in July of 1997. 
Assessment a/the ECOWAS response. It is important to evaluate both the positive and negative 
aspects of the ECOW AS intervention in the Liberian conflict. This assessment is integral in 
determining whether regional peacekeeping forces are a legitimate surrogate to large 
international or United Nations-led contingents. ECOWAS's actions demonstrated, "a bold 
attempt in designing African solutions to African problems within the current environment of 
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international neglect and state failure.,,154 In a situation where both long-time Liberian supporter, 
the U.S., and the United Nations refused to become involved, ECOW AS formulated a swift 
response in order to halt the high number of causalities and refugees. The ECOMOG forces also 
proved "to be far less casualty-scared than, say, those of the United States or other western 
powers.,,155 The organization's willingness to intercede and its steadfast resolve to stop the 
conflict have led even critical observers to "believe that the initial intervention was laudable.,,156 
Other successes of the ECOWAS deployment in Liberia included its ability to contain the 
conflict, "preventing the situation from degenerating into genocidal proportions like the type of 
all-out slaughter witnessed between April and July 1994 in Rwanda.,,157 The series of cease-fires 
between 1990 and 1995, though all ultimately failed, were able to slowing the killing and 
allowing relief supplies to reach citizens. Howe explains that the Bamako cease-fire in 1990 
"certainly saved thousands of lives by preventing a factional battle for Monrovia and by restoring 
peace that allowed food and medical supplies to enter Monrovia [while providing] breathing 
space for subsequent negotiations.,,158 These types of actions mean that the "wider civilian 
populace in Liberia welcomed the presence of ECOMOG in the country.,,159 Many citizens 
viewed ECOMOG force "as the 'deliverer,' who rescued them from the horrors ofwar.,,160 
The formation of a peacekeeping infrastructure was another positive outcome for 
ECOWAS. The creation of ECOMOG was greeted as groundbreaking, because it was the "first 
subregional military force in the third world since the end of the Cold War, and the first 
subregional military force with whom the United Nations agreed to work as a secondary 
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partner.,,161 ECOWAS has continued to expand on its experiences in Liberia and develop a 
foundation for further peacekeeping missions. The 1999 Lome Summit saw the adoption of the 
"Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
keeping, and Security." This protocol broadened the circumstances in which an intervention can 
be authorized, outlining the conditions as, "in the case of conflict between two or several 
Member States; in case of internal conflict: that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or 
that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region.,,162 Other activities 
legitimized under the protocol include "the supervision of elections and general support for the 
development of democratic institutions, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
programmes [for child soldiers], and measures to control the follow of small arms.,,163 With this 
infrastructure finnly in place, ECOW AS has undertaken additional peacekeeping interventions in 
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999), Guinea-Liberia (2001), and Cote d'Ivoire (2002). 
While impressed with the early actions of the ECOMOG force, observers began to point 
out critical mistakes in ECOWAS's function as a peacekeeper. The first problems arose over a 
series of contradictions concerning the ECOMOG mandate. Many observers were skeptical of 
the initial intervention as it attempted to create a cease-fire in the midst of a hostile environment. 
Olonisakin adds that "the traditional concept of peacekeeping presupposes that a cease-fire 
already exists, or that, at the very least, the parties to a conflict have shown a willingness to agree 
to a cease-fire or to pursue a solution via peaceful means.,,164 At the time of the 1990 
intervention neither Taylor's NPFL forces nor Doe's AFL showed any inclination of stopping 
the fighting. International outcries also erupted when ECOMOG declared its intentions to 
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encourage free and fair elections in Liberia. This goal seemed like a "novel function for most of 
ECOMOG's forces, [as] few of the governments contributing to the ECOMOG had been 
democraticallyelected.,,165 In fact, most West African leaders "had gained power through 
military force, like Taylor himself was attempting, and few of them tolerated much domestic 
dissent.,,166 These inherent contradictions in the ECOWAS mandate lost the organization some 
of its international support. 
Another key problem in the ECOW AS intervention was the sharp division among 
ECOW AS members about the nature of the peacekeeping mission. There was a great deal of 
disagreement between the Anglophone and Francophone member states, with Francophone states 
refusing to endorse the intervention. As a result the ECOMOG force was primarily composed of 
soldiers from Anglophone states like Nigeria and Ghana. Many of the Francophone states, like 
Burkina Faso, had previously provided the NPFL with training, logistics, and supplies. Division 
among ECOW AS members also developed as the states discussed what role Charles Taylor 
should play in Liberia's new government. Ghana firmly believed that Taylor was an essential 
part of Liberia's future due to his immense political power and popularity. 167 Nigeria who 
commanded the most control over the mission disagreed, thus very little negotiation took place 
that initially included Taylor.168 Nigeria's role in within ECOW AS has also produced a 
significant amount of criticism. Moller finds that "the greatest weakness of ECOW AS may be 
its critical dependency on the contribution of Nigeria both in military and other terms, and the 
accompanying suspicions that the organization is little more than a convenient multilateral 
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framework for Nigerian interventions.,,169 This Nigerian dominance is made both the 
international community and the warring Liberian factions wary of the ECOMOG mission and 
decreased its effectiveness. 
The negative aspects of the ECOW AS invention mentioned above were further 
compounded by severe operational difficulties. With forces numbering anywhere between 2,700 
and 12,500, while recommendations estimated a need of 20,000 soldiers, ECOMOG forces were 
drastically understaffed. 170 The ECOMOG mission also suffered from a lack of precedence. 
Without any prior experience in peacekeeping, "many [doubted] the credibility of both the force 
and ECOWAS."l71 ECOWAS was forced to intervene without any effective peacekeeping 
infrastructure, creating a series of problems. For instance, the force often lacked the necessary 
technology needed to operate effectively as there was no template of military cooperation to 
build upon. Member states often had under-funded and underdeveloped militaries and would 
hoard [technology and resources] for their own domestic purposes."l72 The troops that did 
participate in the intervention had disparate levels of training, creating a dangerous lack of 
standardization amongst the force. Some militaries had trained pilots and soldiers, while others 
contributed extremely inexperienced, young soldiers. There are countless stories of untrained 
troops unable to hit their targets and mistakenly hitting humanitarian and civilian targets instead. 
Further operational problems were the unexpected language difficulties. With troop 
contingents composed of soldiers from several different member states, there was often a 
language barrier. Commanders in charge of designing the overall mission did not anticipate this 
problem, thus several contingents were unable to effectively communicate their orders to all 
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soldiers. The lack of a peacekeeping infrastructure made it difficult for the organization to 
ensure all soldiers were compensated in a timely manner. Funding from the ECOW AS 
organization was incomplete at the time the mission began, and many of the "junior officers in 
the Nigerian and Sierra Leonean contingents often did not receive their pay for several 
months.,,173 Unpaid soldiers resorted to the "black market or theft from humanitarian relief 
shipments.,,174 
A variety of negative ethical effects also accompanied the ECOW AS intervention into 
Liberia. As mentioned above, the looting and pillaging of ECOMOG soldiers caused many to 
lose respect for the contingent. Other accusations included reports of human rights violations by 
ECOMOG and the factions it supported. Olonisakin finds that "the decision to employ the 
assistance of [the INPFL and the AFL] in countering the NFPL offensive, proved costly for 
ECOMOG.,,175 These groups were charged with allegations that include ethnic-based killings, 
torture, rape and even cannibalism. 176 By aligning themselves with the INPFL and AFL factions, 
ECOMOG destroyed its status as a neutral party. The human rights abuses committed by the 
other factions were attributed to ECOMOG, as ECOMOG provided them with supplies and 
weaponry. These stories of abuse by a peacekeeping force garnered international attention 
causing irreparable damage to the mission's reputation. As the conflict spiraled on, human 
rights organizations like the Human Rights Watch issued strong admonishments criticizing the 
ECOWAS intervention and recommending its withdrawal. 177 
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Evaluation of the Regional Peacekeeping Approach and its Viability 
With both case studies complete it is now necessary to detennine whether regional peacekeeping 
is a viable alternative for sub-Saharan Africa's conflicts. In this section, I will summarize the 
general advantages and disadvantages of the regional peacekeeping approach in practice. 
Following this evaluation, I will propose a role for regional peacekeeping within the larger 
international peacekeeping framework. My proposal will also include suggestions for the 
development of several infrastructural systems to aid in the effectiveness of regional 
peacekeeping. 
Regional Peacekeeping in Practice 
The examples ofthe OAU intervention in Chad and ECOWAS 's mission in Liberia 
accurately depict the complexities involved in undertaking a regional peacekeeping mission. 
Both missions faced many of the same problems. The lack of a peacekeeping infrastructure 
severely limited the abilities of the troops. Without a clear mandate, soldiers were often 
uncert~in of their role in the conflict. They were also unsure as to whether military actions taken 
to disann militias were appropriate. As the first peacekeeping missions of their kind, there was 
not previous precedent to look towards for guidance. This lack of precedence forced the OAU 
and ECOW AS to learn about peacekeeping in a "trial by fire" situation. 
Funding became a key issue for the Liberian and Chadian interventions. As predicted in 
the general theories of regional peacekeeping mentioned earlier in this paper, the finances of 
regional institutions were to ill-equipped to support widespread missions. The domestic 
economies of member-states were not strong enough to contribute the billions of dollars needed 
to adequately fund the interventions. This under-funding led to the development of many other 
problems for the troops. Both military and humanitarian supplies were in short supply. 
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Cutbacks on in training also meant that troops were unprepared for their new roles. As funding 
ran dry many soldiers went unpaid, leading to the widespread looting seen in Liberia. 
A third major problem seen in the experiences of regional peacekeeping missions was the 
violation of international standards of neutrality. The interventions in both Chad and Liberia are 
littered with examples of soldiers favoring one warring faction over another. In some cases this 
progressed from merely providing factions with supplies to full-fledged cooperation with 
militias. Aligning themselves with the warring parties they were supposed to enforce peace 
among, the peacekeeping missions lost authority and respect. The hegemony of Nigeria also 
proved to be a major obstacle. Theorists warned against the dominance ofthe peacekeeping 
process by one nation. Nigeria's lead role in both conflicts further damaged the impartial status 
of the missions. Militia leaders began to view the peacekeeping missions as agents of Nigeria's 
foreign policy. 
While the negative outcomes of regional peacekeeping are numerated in the previous 
paragraphs, there are several aspects of this approach that show promise for the future. The 
desire for African countries to prevent conflicts in their own backyard is a tremendous step 
towards halting the deadly wars ravaging the continent. Neighboring countries are much more 
likely to become involved in conflict prevention as they are directly affected. This offers an 
alternative to the reluctance of international organizations like the UN. This proved especially 
true in Liberia and Chad as ECOW AS and the OAU launched prompt responses when the UN 
refused to become involved in the conflict. The local knowledge that African peacekeepers 
bring to the conflict is a valuable asset to any mission. The countries immediately recognized 
that the tribal conflicts could have a devastating and destabilizing impact on the entire region. 
Another positive outcome is the low-cost of these regional missions. While severely under-
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funded in the case of Chad and Liberia, a properly funded mission still holds significant savings 
over a UN-led mission. 
My evaluation of regional peacekeeping missions in Chad and Liberia leads me to 
conclude that the negative aspects of these missions can be overcome. I find that the regional 
peacekeeping method provides a hopeful direction for the future of peacekeeping missions, 
especially those in conflict prone sub-Saharan Africa. The positive aspects of regional 
peacekeeping mentioned in the previous paragraph demonstrate that if properly developed 
regional peacekeeping has many advantages over a traditional international force; however, in its 
current state regional peacekeeping is unable to assume a lead role in the peacekeeping process. 
In the next section I propose the implementation of a series of infrastructural reforms and support 
mechanisms to improve the regional peacekeeping process. 
Regional Peacekeeping Reform 
In order to utilize the many advantages of a regional peacekeeping force in sub-Saharan 
Africa a permanent infrastructure must be created. The establishment of a regional peacekeeping 
infrastructure will eliminate many of the problems associated with the Chadian and Liberian 
interventions. The key to this new regional peacekeeping structure is the formation of 
peacekeeping institution within each regional body. Much of the chaos of Liberia and Chadian 
missions resulted from the lack of coordination among member-states. By designing a 
permanent peacekeeping branch, a regional organization would be much better prepared in the 
event of conflict. This institution would function as a subsidiary of the larger regional 
organization. For instance, ECOWAS would have a specific sub-group solely in charge of the 
coordination of peacekeeping missions. One key benefit of this plan is the improved and stream-
lined communication between the regional organization and the member-states. The 
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peacekeeping institution would also have the mandate to authorize the deployment of troops and 
the use of force. This type of central authority must be counter-balanced by placing 
representatives from each member-state on the committee with a rotating head in charge of 
leadership. This new structure would prevent missions from being dominated by regional 
hegemons, as was the case with Nigeria in both Chad and Liberia. Another benefit of a 
peacekeeping institution is the standardization of logistics and technology. The regional 
institution would be in charge of all logistics and training of troops, ensuring that soldiers from 
every contingent are working on the same system. 
Following the creation of a sub-regional group, the new institution should begin the task 
of developing a conflict action timeline. This timeline would standardize the responses of the 
regional organization in the instance of conflict within or between its member-states. By setting 
a guideline the regional organization ensures that it responds in a timely manner to any threats of 
conflict. A timeline would also encourage early conflict resolution and prevention measures. A 
mediation process could be initiated in the beginning stages of a conflict, perhaps negating the 
need for a full-scale intervention. The adoption of action timeline guarantees that a regional 
organization will not become involved in peacekeeping missions without the establishment of a 
ceasefire. The premature deployment of troops in both Liberia and Chad without a secure 
ceasefire in place needlessly endangered the lives of many soldiers. 
Another key aspect to reforming the regional peacekeeping process is to refine the 
coordination between regional organizations like the OAU and sub-regional organizations like 
ECOW AS. I believe the primary peacekeeping activities should be undertaken by the regional 
organization (in sub-Saharan Africa this would now be the African Union). The countries of 
sub-regional organizations are often too closely involved with the conflict to operate an 
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effectively neutral force. Sub-regional organizations also have very limited resources with 
which to independently operate a peacekeeping mission. I propose a system of cooperation 
between regional and sub-regional organizations to improve the peacekeeping process. Sub-
regional organizations have an extremely valuable knowledge about local conflicts and tensions, 
and they should still work with the regional peacekeeping institution to identify potential 
conflicts. Sub-regional organizations are also an important source of resources including 
military support and technical and logistical assistance. 
An integral part of reforming regional peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa would be the 
establishment of a standing peacekeeping force. This standing force would almost act as a 
continental army. Member-states would contribute soldiers to serve in the force. Modeled after 
the European Union's proposed Rapid Reaction Force, this peacekeeping force would be 
designed to respond quickly to emerging conflicts. A key advantage of creating a force like this 
is the troop training programs that could be established. Peacekeepers could be specially trained 
in conflict mediation and peacekeeping techniques used by well-respected forces like the United 
Nations. Ethical training could also be integrated into the program. This would aid in 
preventing human rights violations like those observed in Liberia. A standing force would have 
the additional benefit of standardized training and equipment, only increasing cooperation in the 
field. A rapid reaction force would allow the centralization of troops and create a power 
hierarchy which would report directly to the regional peacekeeping institution. This increases 
communication and accountability, while preventing member-states from giving their military 
contingents conflicting orders. 
A standing peacekeeping force offers several other benefits. It would ease the financial 
burden of member-states and make them more likely to contribute soldiers. The standing force 
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would be paid for by the regional organization. While an expensive undertaking, the regional 
organization could solicit funding from larger international organizations and Western countries. 
For instance, many countries like the United States have found regional peacekeeping to be an 
attractive option for conflict prevention. Donating money to a regional organization is a much 
cheaper alternative to becoming directly involved in conflict. A standing peacekeeping force is 
also more likely to garner regional and international respect. As an established and permanent 
institution a regional peacekeeping force will be better revered by warring factions and nations 
than the ever-evolving contingents deployed in Chad and Liberia. A standing peacekeeping 
force can also be utilized in peaceful times. Once training has been completed the force could 
assist in humanitarian missions until regional conflicts arise. 
A final reform of regional peacekeeping is to improve coordination between the UN and 
regional organizations. The UN is the international organization with the most experience in 
peacekeeping missions, and regional organizations should view the UN as an asset. Throughout 
its many difficult missions, the UN has a garnered a wealth of knowledge on how to and how not 
to run a peacekeeping mission. The UN should also foster its relationships with regional 
organizations. The deployment of UN observers and monitors would aid in the training of 
regional peacekeepers and the success of future missions. The rise of regional peacekeeping is 
also positive development for the UN as it lessens their peacekeeping burden. 
Widespread refonn is the only way that regional peacekeeping can assume a lead role in 
conflict prevention. Many lessons can be drawn from the missions in Liberia and Chad, and the 
set of infrastructural improvements I propose are step towards rectifying those mistakes. 
Through the creation of a peacekeeping institution and a standing army, along with improved 
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regional and international coordination, regional peacekeeping can become an effective 
alternative to international peacekeeping missions. 
Conclusion 
This thesis addressed the following research question: Is the rise of regional peacekeeping 
missions in sub-Saharan Africa an effective way of building stable governments and creating a 
lasting peace? Following a careful examination of the dynamics of conflict in Africa and the 
failure of international peacekeeping to effectively respond, I find that regional peacekeeping 
missions are an integral part of the solution to Africa's violence. The case studies in Chad and 
Liberia demonstrated the complex issues involved in regional peacekeeping, and several negative 
outcomes were accurately predicted in the general theories of regional peacekeeping. I proposed 
a series of institutional reforms to remedy these issues. For example, focusing on the creation of 
a permanent peacekeeping infrastructure is essential to creating a successful regional 
peacekeeping force. This includes the founding of specific peacekeeping bodies working in 
coordination with the United Nations, sub-regional organizations, and member-states. The 
improvement of peacekeeping strategies is crucial to resolving conflicts in Africa, and this thesis 
finds that the development regional missions are a central part of this process. 
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